Afghanistan on edge again

Mullah Omar is a tough act for Mullah Mansour to follow, given that he has not yet won over either the Taliban cadres or the Afghan Shura

Updated - March 29, 2016 01:12 pm IST

Published - August 05, 2015 03:17 am IST

“Taliban infighting would herald a new era in the nation’s troubled history. The country could slide into lawlessness, as it did between 1992 and 1996.” Picture shows an Afghan man carrying firewood amid destroyed homes in Kandahar.

“Taliban infighting would herald a new era in the nation’s troubled history. The country could slide into lawlessness, as it did between 1992 and 1996.” Picture shows an Afghan man carrying firewood amid destroyed homes in Kandahar.

Since their appearance on the Afghan political landscape in 1994 and ascendancy to power in 1996, the Taliban have been confronted with formidable resistance and myriad challenges. They fought a relentless war against the legendary commander Ahmad Shah Massoud besides confronting Uzbek commanders such as Abdul Rashid Dostum and Gen. Abdul Malik Pahlawan before consolidating their hold over most of Afghanistan by 1998.

In the brief span of three years, from 1998 to 2001 — when their regime was toppled by the U.S. military intervention — the Taliban got a temporary respite when they formulated a vision for shaping the political and judicial systems of the country in accordance with their interpretation of Islamic beliefs and doctrines.

In their wilderness years — driven out of power by the U.S. on the assumption that Osama bin Laden was the principal sponsor of the 9/11 attacks, whom the Taliban government had sheltered — the insurgent leaders were looking for shelter and support, which was rare. They were shunted from pillar to post, shattered, driven to despondency and, unsurprisingly, some like Wakil Ahmed Mutawakkil and Hakim Mujahid surrendered, unable to bear the unending hardship of being hunted all the time.

The bulk of the movement’s leaders and supporters, however, survived and went on to put in place a defiant military campaign of resistance against one of the most lethal and potent military machines that the world has assembled for many years. The Taliban’s campaign took many military strategists by surprise. Until late 2003, it appeared that Taliban had been consigned to the dustbin of history and that Afghanistan would now be a U.S. outpost to be ruled by its proxies and its ‘enlightened’ representatives, and that the country would be a U.S. dependency to be used in advancing Washington’s politico-military objectives in the region.

The Taliban, however, endured and gained strength as the years wore on. All stratagems, from inducement to power and money, were offered; many individuals engaged in moves to earn their support or win their loyalty to the ‘new scheme of things’. Some fell by the wayside but most spurned the offers and carried on. The year 2014 was the deadliest as far as attacks on the Afghan and coalition forces were concerned. This was ominous, as the coalition forces had thinned out and were on their way to exiting the country.

And now…

Then came the bombshell. It was found that Taliban leader Mullah Omar had been dead for two years. The Taliban had adored and loved Mullah Omar. The insurgency would now be waging a struggle for the first time without the leader who had defied the West and, indeed, the world. He had engaged a superpower in the longest war in its history using rifles, improvised explosive devices, rockets and, above all, volunteers who would gladly die for the cause.

Has all that changed now? Undoubtedly the Taliban faces its darkest hour and its gravest challenge. The challenge is not one of appointing a successor who would be anointed as Amirul Mominnen — the leader of the faithful. The Taliban is faced with an existential threat to its unity. There is doubt about whether and to what extent it can retain its fundamentalist values and norms.

Mullah Akhtar Mansour’s accession to leadership is not going to resolve the fundamental issues that concern not only unity in the ranks but, more importantly, whether the insurgency would consistently follow the trajectory of resistance that has defined the Taliban’s attitude and vision. Any Taliban leader who is suspected of having links with external actors would not carry conviction with the hardcore insurgents.

Mullah Mansour faces multiple and insurmountable obstacles as he tries to consolidate power. Ensuring unity is one of these. Winning over the support of the Shura is another. Shedding the image of a leader too close to Pakistan is perhaps the most demanding challenge. If the cadres in the field develop any notion of their leader’s contacts with external forces, they will lose the motivation to fight. That is the biggest threat to the Taliban.

Mullah Omar projected the image of a leader who would not be “a partner”, “confidante” or “ally”. Those traits helped sustain him at the helm of the Taliban. The incumbent, far from being firmly in the saddle, is seriously handicapped because his mettle and commitment are yet to be established among the cadres, who nurture deep misgivings about his credentials.

If the dilemma is not resolved soon and a clear policy outlined more or less on the lines that Mullah Omar had followed, there will inevitably be divisions in the ranks. That would herald a new era in the troubled history of a troubled nation. The emergence of many commanders, when the central authority loses control, is fraught with dangers. The country can slide into lawlessness, as it did when Burhanuddin Rabbani’s government was confronted by warlords in the period between 1992 and 1996. Then, mayhem and chaos took hold, creating conditions ripe for the Taliban to take control of the country.

Pakistan’s moves

Significant developments loom on the horizon. Pakistan will do well not to give the slightest reason to the rank and file of the Taliban to think that it is covertly orchestrating a transition to a new phase with a new and more pliant leadership. Such a phase might bring a short-term gain, but would irretrievably damage Pakistan’s image not only among the Taliban but also in the Kabul government and, above all, among the Afghan populace. The acrimony and antagonism in Afghanistan against Pakistan would grow.

The best option for Islamabad is to reappraise its policy and invest in the people of Afghanistan, in institution-building in that country, transcending ethnic barriers rather than investing in groups, parties or individuals. Such an Afghanistan — independent, sovereign, stable, and free of insurgency, would be a long-term partner to Pakistan for peace in the region.

(Rustam Shah Mohmand, former Pakistani Interior Secretary, was Ambassador to Afghanistan.)

(Rustam Shah Mohmand, former Pakistani Interior Secretary, was Ambassador to Afghanistan.)

0 / 0
Sign in to unlock member-only benefits!
  • Access 10 free stories every month
  • Save stories to read later
  • Access to comment on every story
  • Sign-up/manage your newsletter subscriptions with a single click
  • Get notified by email for early access to discounts & offers on our products
Sign in

Comments

Comments have to be in English, and in full sentences. They cannot be abusive or personal. Please abide by our community guidelines for posting your comments.

We have migrated to a new commenting platform. If you are already a registered user of The Hindu and logged in, you may continue to engage with our articles. If you do not have an account please register and login to post comments. Users can access their older comments by logging into their accounts on Vuukle.