Kanchanjunga train crash: investigation points to lapses at multiple levels

Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety says it was an “accident-in-waiting”, and points to critical safety failures

Onlookers watch as rescuers work after a cargo train rammed into Kanchanjunga Express, a passenger train, near New Jalpaiguri station, West Bengal state, India, Monday, June 17, 2024. File photo | Photo Credit: AP

A preliminary investigation report of the Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety (CCRS) on the accident involving a goods train and the Kanchanjunga Express in Darjeeling district of West Bengal on June 17, 2024, that left 10 passengers dead and 43 others injured, has found lapses at multiple levels in managing train operations.

The accident pertains to the rear-end collision of a goods train with Train No.13174 Agartala-Sealdah Kanchanjunga Express between Rangapani and Chattar Hat stations in the Katihar Division of the Northeast Frontier Railway.

In his interim report, CCRS Janak Kumar Garg said the accident came under the “error in train working” category. After examining the evidence and statements on record, he said the accident “occurred due to lapses at multiple levels in managing the train operations under automatic signal failures.”

Mr. Garg said there was inadequate counselling of loco pilots and station masters about train operation in automatic signaling territory, creating misinterpretation and misunderstanding of rules. Walkie-talkie sets were not provided to the loco pilot and train manager and they were communicating using mobile phones.

Misunderstanding of rules

Referring to the travel authority T/A 912 issued by the station master of the Rangapani station authorising the loco pilot to cross the signal in danger, he said the signature of the train manager (guard) was not taken on the authority. The traffic inspector and chief loco inspectors were not sure what procedure was required to be followed whenever T/A 912 was issued. There was misinterpretation and misunderstanding of rules at the field level.

“It is really a matter of concern that if the teachers itself [traffic inspector and chief loco inspectors] are not aware of the subject, what knowledge they will impart to students [loco pilot and SS/SM]. Due to improper authority and that too without adequate information such an incident was “Accident-in-Waiting” and finally occurred on June 17, 2024,” he said.

Availability of walkie-talkie sets, being the safety critical equipment, to all loco pilots and train managers of all the trains should be ensured all the time. For this purpose, if required, necessary changes could be made in the procurement policy. Also, recording of conversations made by the station master through walkie-talkie should be ensured by providing VHF receiver-cum-recorder in data logger room.

Signal failures

The CCRS said the large number of signal failures in the automatic signalling territory was a cause of concern and should be taken up with the Research Designs and Standards Organisation (RDSO) and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to improve reliability in the system.

“The large number of signalling failures in the automatic signalling sections is defeating the very purpose of mobility enhancements and causing safety concerns also. This issue needs to be resolved on top priority,” he said.

On the night intervening night of June 17, 2024, the signal control office was manned by a technician. “lt is not possible to manage such a major signalling failure by a staff of technician level. The response of higher officials of the signalling department at the divisional level posted at Katihar has been found lacklustre. Despite being informed about this serious failure, none of them went to the control office to manage and coordinate with other departments.”

Provision of KAVACH

A joint procedural order to deal with signal failures in automatic signalling territory should be issued by the Principal Chief Signal and Telecommunication Engineer, Principal Chief Operations Manager and Principal Chief Electrical Engineer of the Northeast Frontier Railway. Introduction of new automatic signalling routes should be consummate with the provision of KAVACH. Use of Artificial Intelligence and GPS-based technology to avert collisions should be explored.

The CCRS pointed out that 208 cases of Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) cases across the railway network from April 1, 2019 and March 31, 2024, of which 12 cases had resulted in collision, highlighted the limitations of preventive measures taken by the Zonal Railways as regards counselling of loco pilot/assistant loco pilot, safety drives, etc.

Mr. Garg said a lot of changes had happened after the Railway Board issued the General Rules in 1976. “There is a need to revise and re-issue the General Rules. Further, the corresponding Subsidiary Rules is varying across the Zonal Railways. There is a need to bring uniformity in the Subsidiary Rules of Zonal Railways by the Railway Board to the maximum extent possible.”

The CCRS said in his report that crash-worthiness features of passenger coaches should be reviewed. On priority, at least the last two coaches of every passenger-carrying train should have crash-worthiness feature. All new coaches rolled out of production units should have inbuilt crash-worthiness features and existing coaches be retrofitted during major overhaul.

“It is noted that around 500 Integral Coach Factory coaches of different types have been manufactured with crash-worthiness features. These coaches shall be converted into Seating-cum-Luggage Rake [SLR] coaches and attached at either end of the rake to minimise loss of human life and railway property in case of collisions,” he said.