After being in power in Odisha for almost a quarter of a century, the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) not only lost the Assembly election to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) but also failed to win a single Lok Sabha seat in the State. The BJD’s worst performance since its inception can be attributed to multiple factors. More than the BJP’s winning strategy, the BJD’s defeat has more to do with the way it has been functioning as a political party in recent years.
First, bureaucratic hubris became a key reason behind the BJD’s unacceptability among the voters. The party functioned more as a corporate entity, with bureaucrats seen as senior managers. The roles of the BJD’s elected representatives became redundant, with district administrators being considered more powerful than local leaders. The governance’s feedback mechanism was also dependent on local officers. This hampered the popularity of the BJD leaders as they relied on the mercy of the administrators.
In rural belts, the extraordinary surge in perceived grievances of the citizenry over governance issues, as a result of administrative ineffectiveness, gave way to the paribartan (change) narrative. The everyday lives of people in these belts are greatly affected by the functioning of local block offices and police stations. Despite the introduction of pro-people initiatives, these local grievance redress centres were perceived as centres of corruption, a clear departure from the intent of the BJD in its early years.
Second, organisational failure further exacerbated the BJD’s predicament. The absence of a mechanism to deal with inner party conflicts and to accommodate the growing number of aspirants resulted in many BJD loyalists switching sides at the last moment. In most areas, displeased cadres were waiting for the opportune moment to teach the party a lesson, over issues such as faulty candidate selection and unmet long-standing demands. The top leadership, however, was too complacent, relying heavily on the towering popularity of party chief Naveen Patnaik to notice the pressing tensions on the ground. The party’s organisational secretary contesting a new Lok Sabha seat against the Union Education Minister, deserting his home district, a BJD bastion, became emblematic of the unimpressive electioneering of the BJD. The party not only lost from that seat, it was also decimated from one of its bastions.
Further, organisationally, the dependence on the bureaucratic structure was such that once the Election Commission took action against a few key officers, it rattled the party functioning. The overt centralisation within the party also prevented local leaders from countering the opponents’ tactics without permission from the top.
The BJD operates under the assumption that voters’ memories are short-lived. This approach seems to have influenced its ticket distribution strategy and announcement of populist schemes. The party chose to field many of its tainted leaders or their kins, assuming the voters had forgotten their past transgression. Moreover, the party was the last to release its manifesto. Some of the popular promises — such as free electricity or pension for the self-help group members — could not be disseminated well. While in government, it also waited until the very end (enactment of the model code of conduct) to announce some popular measures.
Third, the BJD’s ideological bankruptcy seemed to have brought more damage than good to the party. The party broke its official alliance with the BJP in 2009, citing its secular stand, but it supported almost all Bills brought by the BJP-led government in the subsequent years. The fact that Union Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw was nominated to the Upper House by the BJD reveals a lot about the party’s confused stand. The Minister came back to Odisha to campaign against the BJD, only a few months after his nomination. Many voters were perplexed by the strange game that the BJP and the BJD were playing. The BJD cadre was left with no strong motivation to counter the BJP on the ground.
The BJD, which takes pride in winning elections continuously, has failed this time. However, the popularity of Mr. Patnaik has remained intact. If it were to revive, the foremost goal should be to establish itself as a strong political opponent of the BJP.
Subhankar Nayak is a policy researcher. X: @subhankarnayak
